Background
Japan’s leaders have repeatedly emphasized the urgent need to address Japan’s population crisis. Despite these pledges, successive governments have struggled to address the issue effectively. The demographic crisis has emerged as one of Japan’s most critical concerns, driven by a combination of factors, including a decreasing fertility rate and an increasing elderly population. Each year, more people pass away than are born, rapidly declining Japan’s population. This trend has far-reaching implications for Japan’s workforce, economy, social welfare systems, and overall societal structure. Japan is one of those nations well-known for its sophisticated culture and technological innovations, and it has experienced notable population changes in the last century. This article delves into Japan’s demographic trends from 1950 to 2024, and future population estimates up to the year 2100.
Impact of the Population Crisis
A smaller workforce directly impacts economic growth. With fewer people working and contributing to the economy, Japan faces slower GDP growth and reduced economic dynamism. The labour shortage also drives up wages, increasing costs for businesses and potentially leading to higher consumer prices. An ageing population increases healthcare and social services demand. As spending on pensions and healthcare rises, the Japanese government needs help to balance the budget. The shrinking tax base exacerbates this situation, as fewer workers mean fewer tax revenues. The demographic imbalance affects social cohesion and community life. Rural areas are particularly hard hit, with many villages facing depopulation and a need for more young people to maintain local economies and traditions. The social isolation of the elderly is another pressing issue, as many older adults live alone without family support. Furthermore, the declining population also poses a threat to Japan’s unique cultural heritage, as fewer young people means a smaller pool of individuals to carry on traditional practices and customs.
Root causes of Japan’s population crisis
Fig: 1
In 1950, Japan’s population stood at approximately 84 million (8.4 Cr) and by 2010, its population reached its zenith at around 128 million (12.8 Cr), marking a substantial increase over six decades. However, following the peak in 2010, Japan’s population began to decline. By 2024, Japan’s population is projected to decline to around 123 million (12.3 Cr), signalling a notable departure from the peak witnessed in 2010. Looking ahead, projections suggest that Japan’s population decline will persist, with estimates indicating a further decrease in population figures. By the year 2100, it is projected that Japan’s population will dwindle to approximately 74 million (7.4 Cr) (fig: 1).
Fig: 2
From 1950 to 2024, Japan’s population experienced a notable decline in its Rate of Natural Change, with intermittent exceptions such as the period from 1969 to 1973. A significant turning point occurred in 2005 when Japan recorded its first negative Rate of Natural Change, marking a shift towards population decline. By 2024, the rate of natural change in Japan’s population is estimated to plummet to -6.2, indicating a substantial decline in population growth and exacerbating demographic challenges faced by the nation. Looking ahead, projections suggest a continuation of Japan’s declining Rate of Natural Change. By the period 2065-2069, it is estimated to reach -9.3, reflecting an accelerated pace of population decline. However, a modest increase is projected thereafter, with the Rate of Natural Change anticipated to rise to -6.8 by the year 2100 (fig: 2).
Fig: 3
In 1950, Japan’s median age of the population stood at 21.2 years. Over the ensuing decades, Japan experienced a significant demographic shift characterized by a steady increase in median age. By 2024, the median age of Japan’s population is estimated to surge to 49.5 years, marking a remarkable 2.3-fold increase since 1950. Looking ahead, projections indicate that Japan’s median age of the population will remain relatively stable from 2025 to 2100, hovering around 50 to 55 years (fig: 3).
Fig: 4
Beginning at 1.7% in 1950, Japan experienced a significant decline in its Population Growth Rate over the subsequent decades, punctuated by intermittent exceptions such as the period from 1969 to 1973. Despite these exceptions, the overall trend indicated a notable decrease in population growth. In 2010, Japan recorded its first instance of a negative Population Growth Rate. As of 2024, Japan’s Population Growth Rate is estimated to remain in negative territory. This trend continued to persist, with fluctuations, reaching -0.8% from 2063 to 2070. Looking ahead, projections suggest that Japan’s Population Growth Rate will continue its downward trajectory, albeit at a slower pace. By 2100, the projected Population Growth Rate is estimated to hover around -0.5% (fig: 4).
Fig: 5
In 1950, Japan’s Total Fertility Rate stood at 3.7, indicating a relatively high level of fertility. By 1957, Japan reached the replacement level of fertility for the first time, with a TFR of 2.1, suggesting that each woman, on average, was having enough children to replace herself and her partner in the population. This replacement level remained relatively stable until 1973, with intermittent fluctuations, such as in 1966 when the TFR dropped to 1.6. However, from 1950 to 2024, Japan witnessed a substantial decline in its TFR, reaching 1.3 by 2024, marking a decrease of around three times from its 1950 level. As of 2024, Japan’s Total Fertility Rate is projected to remain low at 1.3, reflecting a persistent trend towards declining fertility rates. Looking ahead, projections suggest a modest increase in Japan’s Total Fertility Rate from 1.3 in 2024 to 1.6 by 2100. While this represents a slight uptick compared to the preceding years, it remains below the replacement level of fertility (fig: 5).
Fig: 6
In 1950, Japan’s Crude Birth Rate stood at 28.3, indicating a relatively high rate of births. Conversely, the Crude Death Rate in the same year was 11.1. In 2005, a significant demographic shift occurred as the Crude Death Rate surpassed the Crude Birth Rate for the first time, marking a pivotal moment in Japan’s demographic transition. This reversal reflected a declining birth rate and an ageing population. In subsequent years, Japan witnessed divergent trends in the Crude Birth Rate and Crude Death Rate. While the Crude Birth Rate continued to decrease gradually, the rate of decline was outpaced by the increase in the Crude Death Rate. This divergence underscored the demographic challenges facing Japan, including a declining fertility rate and an increasingly elderly population. Looking ahead to 2100, projections suggest that the Crude Death Rate will continue to rise, reaching 14.1, while the Crude Birth Rate is projected to decline further to 7.2. This projection reflects ongoing demographic trends characterized by low fertility rates and an ageing population, with significant implications for Japan’s social welfare systems, economy, and overall societal structure (fig: 6).
Fig: 7
Japan has witnessed a remarkable increase in life expectancy at birth (LEB) since 1950, reflecting advancements in healthcare, nutrition, and overall quality of life. In 1950, the LEB stood at 59.2 years, representing a snapshot of the nation’s health landscape in the post-war era. Over the ensuing decades, Japan experienced significant improvements in life expectancy, and LEB is expected to reach an impressive 84.9 years by 2024, which implies an increase of 43.4%. This substantial increase underscores the success of Japan’s healthcare system and societal efforts to promote well-being and longevity. Looking ahead, projections indicate a continued upward trajectory for Japan’s life expectancy. By the year 2100, the LEB is estimated to reach an astounding 94 years, underscoring the nation’s ongoing commitment to health promotion and disease prevention (fig: 7).
Fig: 8
The marriage rate in Japan remained relatively stable around 6 to 6.4 from 1990 to 2002. However, starting from 2002, there was a notable decline in marriages, with the rate dropping to 4.3 by 2020 (fig: 8).
Japan’s declining and ageing population presents complex challenges that require holistic solutions encompassing economic, social, and demographic dimensions. Addressing labour shortages, revitalizing rural economies, and ensuring access to essential services are critical priorities for sustaining Japan’s prosperity and well-being in the face of demographic change. Proactive policy interventions and innovative approaches will be essential to navigate the demographic challenges and safeguard Japan’s future economic and social vitality.
Potential Solutions
Addressing the low birth rate is not just a personal issue; it’s a societal one. Creating an environment where people can balance work and family life is not just a policy, it’s a collective responsibility. Policies that support flexible working hours, remote work, and parental leave can help. Encouraging companies to adopt family-friendly practices and reducing the stigma around men taking paternity leave is crucial.
Financial incentives, such as subsidies for child-rearing expenses, accessible or affordable childcare, and housing assistance, can alleviate some economic burdens of raising children. Additionally, investing in early childhood education and healthcare services can provide the support families need.
While Japan has traditionally resisted large-scale immigration, it is increasingly seen as a necessary measure to counteract population decline. This resistance is rooted in Japan’s cultural homogeneity and concerns about maintaining social cohesion. However, the current demographic crisis is forcing a reevaluation of these policies. Creating a more welcoming environment for foreign workers and providing pathways to permanent residency and citizenship can help supplement the labour force.
Automation and artificial intelligence can mitigate some effects of the labour shortage. By increasing productivity and efficiency, technology can help industries cope with fewer workers. However, this must be balanced with policies that ensure workers displaced by automation find new employment opportunities. Extending the retirement age and promoting the re-employment of older adults can help maintain a larger workforce. Many older adults are willing and able to work, and their experience and skills can be valuable assets.
Japan’s population crisis is undeniably a complex and multifaceted challenge, but it is not insurmountable. A comprehensive and multifaceted response is not just a possibility, it’s a necessity. By promoting work-life balance, supporting families, embracing immigration, leveraging technology, and encouraging elderly participation in the workforce, Japan cannot only navigate this demographic challenge but also build a more sustainable future. The lessons learned from Japan’s experience can also provide invaluable insights for other countries grappling with similar demographic issues, instilling hope and confidence in the potential of these solutions.
References
- Bloomberg, E. Y. /. (2024, July 25). Japan’s population falls at record rate. TIME. https://time.com/7003107/japan-record-population-decline/
- Urata, S. (2024). Combating depopulation in Japan. https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1709643600
- Pirotto, C. J. (2016). Japan’s population crisis: Determining the effectiveness of Japanese population policy (Master’s thesis, San Diego State University).
- Yamashige, S. (2014). Population crisis and family policies in Japan. Univ Tokyo J Law Politics, 11, 108-128.
- Koyama, A., Ozaki, A., Hori, A., & Tanimoto, T. (2024). Tackling Japan’s population crisis by improving the childcare environment. The Lancet, 404(10450), 333-334.
About Author:
Pankaj Chowdhury is a former Research Assistant at the International Economic Association. He holds a Master’s degree in Demography & Biostatistics from the International Institute for Population Sciences and a Bachelor’s degree in Statistics from Visva-Bharati University. His primary research interests focus on exploring new dimensions of in computational social science and digital demography.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of 360 Analytika.
Acknowledgement: The author extends his gratitude to the World Population Prospects for providing data support.
This article is posted by Sahil Shekh, Editor-in-Chief at 360 Analytika.
